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Abstract—Deep Neural Networks (DNN) are increasingly used
in a variety of applications, many of them with substantial
safety and security concerns. This paper introduces DeepCheck,
a new approach for validating DNNs based on core ideas from
program analysis, specifically from symbolic execution. The idea
is to translate a DNN into an imperative program, thereby
enabling program analysis to assist with DNN validation. A basic
translation however creates programs that are very complex to
analyze. DeepCheck introduces novel techniques for lightweight
symbolic analysis of DNNs and applies them in the context of
image classification to address two challenging problems in DNN
analysis: 1) identification of important pixels (for attribution and
adversarial generation); and 2) creation of 1-pixel and 2-pixel
attacks. Experimental results using the MNIST data-set show that
DeepCheck’s lightweight symbolic analysis provides a valuable
tool for DNN validation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Deep Neural Networks (DNN) are increasingly used in a
variety of applications, many of them with substantial safety
and security concerns [19]. Our focus in this paper is on image
classifiers: DNNs that take in complex, high dimensional
input, pass it through multiple layers of transformations, and fi-
nally assign to it a specific output label. Such networks are now
being integrated into the perception modules of autonomous
or semi-autonomous vehicles, at major car companies such
as Tesla, BMW, Ford, and others. It is expected that this
trend will continue and intensify, with neural networks being
increasingly used in safety critical applications which require
high assurance guarantees.
Thus, the traditional emphasis on obtaining high accu-
racy for DNNs is being augmented with safety and secu-
rity goals [15]. However, validating DNNs is complex and
challenging, due to the nature of the learning techniques that
create these models. For example, it is not well understood
why a DNN, say an image classifier, gives a particular output.
This inability to explain the DNN decisions hinders their
application in safety critical domains, such as autonomy.
Furthermore, evaluating the robustness of a network, e.g.,
against conceptually simple yet effective attacks, such as 1-
pixel attacks, where just one pixel on an image is altered to
make the network classify the image incorrectly, is a hard
technical problem, due to the huge input space of all images.
This paper presents an approach for the analysis of deep
neural networks based on symbolic execution [7], [18]. Sym-
bolic execution is a well-known program analysis technique
that has seen many advances in recent years [3], [4], [13],
[17], [24] and applications in various domains, such as secu-
rity [6], [8], smartphone apps [1], operating systems [31], and
databases [11].
Traditional symbolic execution executes programs on sym-
bolic, instead of concrete, inputs and systematically explores
the program paths (up to a given depth bound). For each path
explored, it builds path conditions, i.e., constraints on program
inputs that execute that path based on the conditional branches
in the code. To illustrate, when a conditional statement, say
“if(c)...” is executed, each of the two conditional branches is
individually explored, and the path condition PC is updated to
PC∧c for the then branch and to PC∧¬c for the else branch.
The feasibility of the path conditions is checked using off-the-
shelf constraint solvers, such as satisfiability modulo theories
(SMT) solvers [2], [9], as branch conditions are encountered
during symbolic execution to detect and avoid infeasible paths
(if possible) and to generate test inputs that execute feasible
paths (as desired). Overall, the program effects are computed
as functions over the symbolic inputs.
Symbolic execution for deep neural networks is attractive
because it would allow us to extract mathematical characteriza-
tions (in the form of path conditions and symbolic expressions)
of the internal behavior of the networks, which are notoriously
opaque. The information computed with symbolic execution
– even without constraint solving – can be used to examine
the coverage of the neural network, to extract explanations
of behavior, and to identify pixels sensitive to adversarial
behavior. Symbolic execution with constraint solving can also
be used to generate new inputs to test the networks and find
new vulnerabilities.
However, there are several challenges to developing effec-
tive symbolic execution for neural networks: (1) typically the
networks have no branching; (2) the networks in general are
highly non-linear, and solvers for constraints that ensue for
such systems are not well-developed; and (3) there are serious
scalability issues: state-of-the art neural networks consist of
thousands of neurons that are well beyond the capabilities of
current symbolic reasoning tools.
Our idea is that a class of neural networks can be translated
to imperative programs that can feasibly be analyzed using
core ideas from symbolic execution. Specifically, we apply
symbolic execution to networks that use the rectified linear
units (ReLUs) activation functions. These activation functions
naturally admit a branching structure of the form “if (x >
0) ... else ...”, and thus, a path through the neural network
can conceptually be viewed as a path through the translated
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2program. Hence, path conditions for paths through the network
can be built using symbolic execution of the corresponding
program, and analyzed as needed.
We apply symbolic execution to select program paths of
interest, e.g., paths taken by specific input images, say from
the network’s training data. However, just building the path
condition for even one path, say using a straightforward
application of concolic (or dynamic symbolic) execution [3],
[4], [13], [24], can take considerable amount of time, and
solving a path condition with just one symbolic variable can
stress modern SMT solvers due to the parsing and simplifi-
cations the solver must do to handle constraints, which are
conceptually rather simple but syntactically quite complex.
We introduce efficient techniques for building path conditions
and utilizing solvers. Our approach embodies a lightweight
yet particularly insightful analysis that offers insights into the
reasoning performed by the networks to make classification
decisions with no constraint solving at all, and allows a
directed approach for creating adversarial images for network
validation with minimal constraint solving.
This paper makes the following contributions:
• Idea. We introduce the idea of using symbolic execution
for analyzing neural networks by translating them to
imperative code that is practical to analyze, specifically
focusing on important pixel identification, and 1-pixel and
2-pixel attack generation.
• Approach. We introduce the DeepCheck approach that is
based on translating neural networks with rectified linear
units to analyzable imperative code and embodied by
two validation techniques; DeepCheckImp, which applies
symbolic execution for identifying important pixels that
intuitively provide explanations for why neural networks
make certain decision; and DeepChecktPA, which applies
symbolic execution to create 1-pixel and 2-pixel attacks.
• Evaluation. We present an experimental evaluation to
address three key research questions using the MNIST
dataset that consists of images of numeric digits and has
been widely studied in literature. The experimental results
show that it is feasible to use symbolic execution to
identify important pixels and to create 1-pixel and 2-pixel
attacks, and that important pixels enable a more scalable
approach for generating 1-pixel and 2-pixel attacks. For
example, for images of 9 out of 10 digits, a 2-pixel attack
is found by checking the 2-pixel combinations of just
top-4 important pixels, i.e., a pair of pixels to attack the
network is found by checking no more than 6 pixel pairs.
II. BACKGROUND: NEURAL NETWORKS
Neural networks are often used as classifiers, meaning that
they assign to each input an output label/class. Such a neural
network F can be regarded as a function that assigns to
input x an output label y, denoted as F (x) = y. Internally,
a neural network is comprised of multiple layers of nodes,
called neurons. Each node refines and extracts information
from values computed by nodes in the previous layer. The
first layer is the input layer, which takes in the input variables
(also called features).The network may have several hidden
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Fig. 1: (a) Example image with predicted label 3. (b) Top-
5% important pixels (highlighted in green) identified by
DeepCheckImp. (c) Top-10% important pixels (green) identi-
fied by DeepCheckImp. (d) 1-pixel attack (highlighted in red)
identified by DeepChecktPA; changing the red-pixel to black
changes the predicted label to 8. (e) 2-pixel attack (red) that
does include an attackable pixel for 1-pixel attack.
layers: each of its neurons computes a weighted sum of the
input variables according to a unique weight vector and a bias
value, and then applies an activation function to the result
(hW,b(x) = f(
∑3
i=1Wixi + b)). Most recent networks use
rectified linear units (ReLUs) activation functions. A rectified
linear unit has output 0 if the input is less than 0, and raw
output otherwise; f(x) = max(x, 0). The last layer uses a
softmax function to assign an the output class is the input.
The softmax function squashes the outputs of each node of
the previous layer to be between 0 and 1, equivalent to a
categorical probability distribution. The number of nodes in
this layer is equal to the number of output classes and their
respective outputs gives the probability of the input being
classified to that class.
III. OVERVIEW
This section gives an illustrative overview of our approach
to demonstrate our reduction of deep neural nets to imperative
code and use of symbolic execution. Our subject neural
network N is a fully connected 784×10×10×10×10 network,
which has been trained on all 60,000 images in the training
data of the MNIST dataset [20], and has an accuracy of 92%.
Given the trained network N , we apply our technique
DeepCheckτ to translate it to an imperative program P that has
the same behavior as the original network but is amenable to
program analysis. Figure 1(a) shows an example image I from
the standard MNIST training data, which has the predicted
label of 3 (which is the same as its true label).
A. Identifying important pixels
Given I as an input, our important pixel identification
technique DeepCheckImp executes the program P , and for
the execution path taken by I, computes for every output
label, a linear expression in terms of the input variables which
are the 784 pixels of the input image. The algorithm then
uses the coefficients of the input pixels in the expression
corresponding to the label assigned by the network (3 in the
case of the example), to assign an importance score for every
pixel. A pixel p1 is considered more important than another
p2, if the classification decision is impacted more by p1 than
p2. DeepCheckImp employs three metrics; abs, co, coi, to
calculate the importance of each pixel. The pixels are then
sorted in the descending order of their scores. The pixels which
are higher on this list (top threshold %) are identified as being
important. The insight is that the short-listed important pixels
3can be held responsible for the classification decision or the
classification can be explained or attributed to them. Therefore,
a small change to the image with respect to the important
pixels, such as changing the value of just one important pixel
can have a high impact on the classification decision, and
sometimes may lead to the discovery of adversarial examples
– the new image differs from the original image by the value
of just one pixel but this makes the network incorrectly assign
a different label to this image.
Figure 1(b) illustrates the top-5%, i.e., 39, important pixels
highlighted in green. Note, how the important pixels trace
the shape of the digit 3 and do not point to areas of the
image irrelevant to the digit being identified as 3 such as
the background or the edges. Figure 1(c) illustrates the top-
10%, i.e., 78, important pixels highlighted in green. These
important pixels form a denser pattern that traces the shape
of the digit 3. This highlights that short-listing pixels based
on their importance score in terms of the coefficients of the
expression for the expected label, enables the identification of
pixels that can explain the classification decision.
B. Identifying attack pixels
Conceptually, our t-pixel attack technique DeepChecktPA
aims to create a new image that differs from the original image
at t pixels, and has (1) the same activation pattern as the
original image but (2) a different label from the original image.
Specifically, for a 1-pixel attack, DeepChecktPA selects a pixel
p, makes its value symbolic ps, retains the original concrete
values for all other pixels, and constructs a constraint-solving
problem, which requires (1) execution of the same path up
to the output layer as the original image I and (2) change
in the output label from the original predicted label of I.
The constraint-solving problem consists of a simplified path
condition for image I’s execution path such that the path
condition contains only one symbolic value, i.e., ps. If the
constraint is satisfiable, a solution provides the value for pixel
p to create the 1-pixel attack image. For solving constraints,
we use the SMT solver Z3 [9].
DeepChecktPA checks whether any pixel of I can be
attacked by making one pixel symbolic at a time and checking
the resulting path condition. Figure 1(d) shows a 1-pixel attack
identified by our approach for image I; changing the red pixel
to black changes the predicted label of the image to 8. This
attackable pixel actually lies in the top-5% (top 39) important
pixels for I identified by DeepCheckImp. The rank order of
this attackable pixel in descending order of importance is 21.
For this case, focusing the 1-pixel attack on important pixels
can allow finding an attack much quicker than checking every
pixel for attackability. In fact, this image only has one 1-pixel
attack. A linear search that starts at the first image pixel (top-
left corner) and scans left-to-right takes 346 attempts to find
this attack pixel, which is over 16X the attackable pixel’s rank-
order (21). We believe important pixels can provide a practical
heuristic for a more scalable approach to create attacks.
To create 2-pixel attacks, we focus DeepChecktPA on the
important pixels identified by DeepCheckImp, specifically on
the top-5% important pixels. We make
(
39
2
)
= 741 unordered
pairs of the selected important pixels, and for each pair, we
make the two corresponding variables symbolic, so each path
condition created by symbolic execution contains exactly two
symbolic variables. Applying DeepChecktPA to the 741 pairs
results in 93 unique 2-pixel attacks. 38 of the 2-pixel attack
pairs contain as an element the pixel that was earlier identified
for the 1-pixel attack, whereas 55 of the pairs contain only
pixels that are not 1-pixel attackable; Figure 1(e) shows one
such pair in red.
For this example the important pixels identified by
DeepCheckImp play a key role in focusing DeepChecktPA to
find a 2-pixel attack. The first attack found by DeepChecktPA
includes the 2 of the 3 top-most important pixels. Thus, the
search for a 2-pixel attack for this example requires checking
no more than just
(
3
2
)
= 3 pairs.
These results illustrate the potential of using symbolic
execution in identifying important pixels and creating 1-pixel
and 2-pixel attacks, as well as the value of important pixels
in finding attackable pixels and pixel-pairs.
IV. TECHNIQUE
We build a symbolic execution framework that i) translates a
given neural network into a semantically equivalent imperative
program, ii) performs symbolic execution to collect constraints
on paths for specific concrete inputs, iii) identifies input fea-
tures or pixels important to the classification, and iv) synthe-
sizes adversaries that fool the network into misclassification.
A. Symbolic Execution Framework
The input to our framework is a feed-forward neural
network with linear activation functions. Consider network
NN with m inputs X :< x0, ..., xm−1 >, nl layers with l
representing each layer, the weights being represented as wli,j ,
i.e., the weight of the edge connecting the node j in layer l
to node i in layer l + 1, blj representing the bias term added
to the weighted sum of the input variables from layer l to the
node j in layer l + 1. Let Y :< y0, ..., yn−1 > be the output
of the nodes before the application of softmax where n is the
number of output labels. We consider the second last layer to
be the output layer of our model. The output of the classifier is
calculated as the index containing the maximum value at the
output layer. The goal is to translate NN to an imperative
program P such that for any input x, NN(x) = P(x).
The input state of P is Sinp =< si0 , ..., sim−1 >, where
each si corresponds to an input variable xi, the output state
is Sop =< so0 , ..., son−1 >, where each so corresponds to
yi, and the hidden nodes represent the intermediate states
Sh =< sh0 , ..., s
h
x−1 > where h is the hidden layer number
and vh is the number of neurons in layer h.
a) Translation: A typical neural network structure does
not have any branching. However, observe that in the case of
rectified linear units, the activation function f(x) = max(0, x)
can be naturally translated into a branching instruction, if
(x > 0) then return x; else return 0;. Thus, a path through the
neural network can be seen as a path through the translated
program, where each executed branch corresponds to the
neural network node being activated or not. Every neuron,
which is the basic computational unit of the network, applies
the function, hW,b(x) on its input x (section II, where x is
4Fig. 2: Code-snippet for Neuron i.
the outputs of the nodes in the previous layer respectively. The
code-snippet corresponding to a node i in layer h is shown
in Figure 2, where vh−1 represents the number of nodes at
layer h − 1. This code is invoked v times for every node of
the layer h. The corresponding outputs are fed as inputs to the
subsequent layer, until the layer before softmax to calculate
Sop =< so0 , ..., son−1 >.
b) Analysis: Once we translate a given NN to a cor-
responding semantically equivalent P , we perform execution
in concolic mode on a given concrete input. The sections
below describe this process and explain how it is used to
identify important input attributes and synthesize attacks using
constraint solving.
B. Identifying important pixels
This section describes in the detail the algorithm of
DeepCheckImp to short-list important pixels that could act as
explanations for the classification decision and also identify
pixels vulnerable to adversaries.
The function representing a multiple-layer neural network
could be expressed in terms of the weights and biases for
every layer. Consider the network NN as defined earlier.
Let ahj represent the intermediate outputs of the hidden
nodes in layer h and node j. For instance, for a three layer
network, presented below would be the representation of the
output in terms of the weights and biases of the network.
a10 = f(w
0
0,0 ∗ x0 + w00,1 ∗ x1 + w00,2 ∗ x2 + b00)
a11 = f(w
0
1,0 ∗ x0 + w01,1 ∗ x1 + w02,2 ∗ x2 + b01)
a12 = f(w
0
2,0 ∗ x0 + w02,1 ∗ x1 + w02,2 ∗ x2 + b01)
a20 = y0 = f(w
1
0,0 ∗ a10 + w10,1 ∗ a11 + w10,2 ∗ a12 + b10)
a21 = y1 = f(w
1
1,0 ∗ a10 + w11,1 ∗ a11 + w11,2 ∗ a12 + b11)
In the case of a network having linear activations such as
f(x) being a ReLU function, the network is a linear model.
Each element of the Y could be expressed in the form of a
linear polynomial expression in terms of the input variables.
For instance, in the previous equation for y0, we could remove
the function term and replace the values of ahj with their
respective equations in terms of the input variables (assuming
each ahj evaluates to a value greater than or equal to 0).
y0 = w
1
0,0∗(w00,0∗x0+w00,1∗x1+w00,2∗x2+b00)+w10,1∗(w01,0∗
x0+w
0
1,1 ∗x1+w02,2 ∗x2+b01)+w10,2 ∗(w02,0 ∗x0+w02,1 ∗x1+
w02,2 ∗x2+b01)+b10. In general in a feed-forward network with
ReLU activation functions, each output element, yi, could be
expressed as yi = Ci,0 ∗ x0 +Ci,1 ∗ x1 + ...+Ci,n−1 ∗ xn−1,
where Ci,0 to Ci,n−1 are coefficients (signed) of the linear
polynomial, that can calculated in terms of the weights of the
non-zero edges from xj to yi.
Fig. 3: operations for coef array represent element vise
addition and multiplication (· represents dot-product).
Ci,j =
# of paths from xj to yi∑
p=0
(
# of edges in p∏
e=0
w(e)) (1)
a) DeepCheckImp Algorithm:: Given a concrete input
value I and a translation of the neural network into a program
P , DeepCheckImp instruments the code such that execution
of the program on the input also simultaneously updates
its impact on the input variables, thereby finally computing
the coefficients for the input pixels in the output expression
corresponding to the classification decision, ylabel. It then uses
them to identify the important pixels. Let us consider the
program P as defined before. Each of these state variables
are data-dependent on the input variables. Therefore, we
maintain a coefficients array of the size of the input variables
corresponding to each of the state-variables, coefhi,j , where h
is the layer number (0 to the second-last layer), i is the neuron
or node number at that layer (0 to vh − 1) and j is the index
of the input variable (0 to m− 1).
Given a concrete input I, the co-efficient array is initial-
ized as follows coef0i,j = 1 if i = j, 0 otherwise. The
execution follows the path taken by the concrete input, i.e.
path conditions are evaluated as per the input values. Every
time an operation is encountered during the execution of the
path, the coefficients arrays are updated accordingly. Consider
the code-snippet (Fig. 3) showing the operations performed
to calculate the concrete value of shi and the corresponding
update to coefficients coefhi,0, ..., coef
h
i,m−1. Note that since
the calculation is done dynamically as the network is being
executed on the given input, the co-efficient arrays are updated
based on the actual values of the activation functions. For
instance, wherever the ReLU activation function evaluates to
a zero, the respective co-efficient arrays get reset to zeros.
After the execution of the first hidden layer 1, for each
neuron i the coefficients corresponding to each input variable
would be w00,i, w
0
1,i, ...w
0
m−1,i respectively. Similarly after the
execution of the second hidden layer 2, for each neuron i,
the coefficients corresponding to each input variable would be
w10,i∗w00,0+w11,i∗w00,1+ ...+w1v1,i∗w00,v1 , ..., w10,i∗w0m−1,0+
w11,i ∗ w0m−1,1 + ... + w1v1,i ∗ w0m−1,v1 , where the values of
w00,x, ..., w
0
m−1,x would be equivalent to zeros respectively if
s1x evaluates to zero. Therefore, ultimately at the layer before
softmax, the coefficients computed for ylabel corresponding
to the each input variable would be the summation of the
products of weights along the non-zero edges from each
input variable to ylabel, equivalent to Eq. 1. Note that these
5coefficients may be different from the one extracted from
the entire model with no non-zero edges. The coefficients
extracted by DeepCheckImp precisely corresponds to the non-
zero edges of the network for the given input.
Importance metrics: Many existing techniques use a
gradient-based approach VI to determine the impact of each
input variable on specific output variables. In a linear model,
the partial derivative of an output variable w.r.t an input
variable dyi/dxj precisely corresponds to the corresponding
co-efficient Ci,j . Therefore, we use the value of the co-
efficient of the input variable to determine its impact on the
output variable, akin to gradient based approaches that use
the derivative to determine the impact of each input variable.
More specifically, we consider the coefficients of the output
variable corresponding to the label assigned by the network
to the input, ylabel. We calculate an important score for each
input variable w.r.t. three metrics presented below;
• co: We consider the actual values of the coefficients
(signed partial derivative dylabel/dxj ) to determine the
impact of the input variables on ylabel. This metric
would assign higher scores to input variables that would
impact ylabel for all inputs semantically equivalent to
the given input; trigger the same activations for the
network but may have different values for the input
variables. For the example Figure 1, the following were
the top ten input pixels with the corresponding co values
< pixel, value >; < 742, 1.137 >,< 489, 1.013 >
,< 488, 1.006 >,< 434, 0.914 >,< 286, 0.905 >
,< 458, 0.887 >,< 666, 0.879 >,< 408, 0.832 >,<
377, 0.825 >,< 383, 0.816 >,< 739, 0.805 >
• coi: In order to identify pixels that can be attributed for
the classification decision for the specific given input, we
need to consider the input values as well. This can be
determined by multiplying the co-efficient values with
the corresponding input values, similar to techniques
such as DeepLIFT [25] (xj ∗ dyi/dxj). These would
serve as better explanations for the specific input to be
assigned the specific label. For the example Figure 1, the
following were the top ten input pixels with the corre-
sponding coi values < pixel, value >; < 434, 1.365 >
,< 405, 1.076 >,< 318, 0.901 >,< 292, 0.890 >
,< 662, 0.881 >,< 237, 0.826 >,< 433, 0.788 >
,< 209, 0.776 >,< 403, 0.773 >,< 463, 0.695 >,<
177, 0.625 >
• abs: The absolute values of the coefficients for the expres-
sion corresponding to ylabel represent the magnitude of
the impact that a change in the respective input variable
would have on the value of ylabel, irrespective of whether
it causes an increase or decrease. Therefore, akin to
saliency maps, absolute value of coefficients could aid
in identifying input variables that the classification is
most vulnerable to. A small change in the value of these
variables can lead to the decision changing thus poten-
tially identifying adversarial examples. For the example
Figure 1, the following were the top ten input pixels
with the corresponding abs values < pixel, value >;
< 742, 1.136 >,< 489, 1.013 >,< 488, 1.006 >
,< 415, 0.986 >,< 441, 0.978 >,< 434, 0.914 >
,< 286, 0.905 >,< 482, 0.899 >,< 458, 0.887 >,<
666, 0.879 >,< 293, 0.872 >
The input variables are ordered in descending order of their
importance scores and the pixels corresponding to the top
threshold % of the scores are short-listed as being important.
The value of the threshold can be user-defined. We have
experimented with 5, 10 and 30.
C. Synthesizing Attacks
For a given input image I, DeepChecktPA sets t pixels with
symbolic values and the rest pixels with concrete values. Then,
it collects path condition of I for the neural network program
P right before the softmax layer, i.e. layer Y . The final path
condition is a conjunction of inequalities (introduced by the
ReLU function) of the form PC =
H∧
h=1
(Bh+
t∑
i=1
Chi ·Xi γ 0),
where h represents the hth activation function defined by
the computation order, H is the total number of activation
functions. In our fully connected network N , each hidden
neuron corresponds to an ReLU activation function and we
use the same computation order of the activation function to
refer hidden neurons. Bh is the bias term of the output value
of the hth hidden neuron; Chi and Xi are the i
th coefficient
and symbolic value of the hth hidden neuron, respectively.
γ ∈ {>,≤} and is determined by the activeness of the
hth hidden neuron. The path condition determines the neuron
activation pattern from the network point of view. In practice,
the number of conjunct clauses is smaller than H because
sometimes all coefficients of the symbolic values (Chi ) are 0
in which case the entire conjunct clause evaluates to true.
The output value of the jth (j ∈ [1, n]) neuron in layer
Y is a function of symbolic values of the form fj(X) =
Bj +
t∑
i=1
Cji · Xi. Assume that the network predict label l
(l ∈ [1, n]) for the input I, then DeepChecktPA add constraints
AC =
n∧
j=1,j 6=l′
fj(X) < fl′(X) to require the network to
predict a label l′ where l 6= l′. Additionally, DeepChecktPA
add constraints RA =
t∧
i=1
lo ≤ Xi ≤ hi, where lo and hi
are the lower and upper bound of input values after data
normalization. This is to make sure the solution of Xi is
in the range. DeepChecktPA invokes Z3 with constraints
PC ∧ AC ∧ RC to solve for concrete values for all Xi.
If a solution is found, DeepChecktPA succeeds in a t pixel
attack by setting X with the concrete values Z3 returns and the
network predicts label l′ which is different from the original
predicted label l with the same neuron activation pattern.
V. EVALUATION
This section describes an experimental evaluation of
DeepCheck, specifically the important pixel identification
technique DeepCheckImp and the t-pixel attack technique
DeepChecktPA. We address three key research questions:
• RQ1. Does symbolic execution enable important pixel
identification? (Section V-B)
6Fig. 4: Ten images from the MNIST training dataset [20].
Fig. 5: Attackable pixels for 1-pixel attack highlighted in red.
• RQ2. Does symbolic execution enable 1-pixel attacks and
2-pixel attacks? (Section V-C)
• RQ3. How do important pixels identified by
DeepCheckImp compare with pixels that can be
attacked using DeepChecktPA? (Section V-D)
A. Subject Neural Network and Images
As our subject neural net we use the image classification
network that we described in Section III. Recall, it is a
fully connected 784×10×10×10×10 network, which has been
trained on all 60,000 images in the training data of the
MNIST dataset [20], and has an accuracy of 92%. We use
10 images from the training data as subject base images for our
evaluation; the images cover all 10 labels 0, 1, . . . , 9. Figure 4
graphically displays them.
B. Important pixel identification
For each image, we apply DeepCheckImp to compute a
ranked list of pixels according to their relative importance
based on three ranking metrics: abs, co, coi. Table I graphically
shows the results produced by DeepCheckImp for the three
metrics for top-5% and top-10% of important pixels. For each
image (digit), the table displays the important pixels in green.
(Appendix A Table VII displays the results for top-30% of the
important pixels with respect to the three metrics.)
For top-5% and top-10% results, each metric generally
identifies pixels in the central part of the image as most
important, with top-10% forming a denser pattern than top-5%.
The abs and co metrics show similar patterns in the central
region. The coi metric most closely follows the digit’s shape.
Overall, the use of symbolic execution enables identifica-
tion of important pixels that help explain the classification
decisions of the neural network.
C. t-pixel attack
We apply DeepChecktPA for 1-pixel attack and for 2-pixel
attack. For 1-pixel attack, for each image, we evaluate each of
the 784 pixels in the image to determine if it is attackable, i.e.,
can be given a different value to change the image’s predicted
label while preserving the neuron activation pattern. Figure 5
highlights, for each digit, each attackable pixel (in red) for a
1-pixel attack. The attackable pixels lie on or very close to the
shape of the corresponding digit.
digit 5%(39) 10%(78)
abs co coi abs co coi
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
TABLE I: Top-5% and top-10% of important pixels (green)
identified by DeepCheckImp for abs, co, and coi.
digit 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
#ap 25 4 1 1 6 36 1 47 2 3
alabel 5 3 3 8 6 3 5,8 9 1 4
1stap 244 489 516 346 71 103 486 156 211 240
TABLE II: Number of 1-pixel attackable pixels (#ap) identified
by DeepChecktPA for each image (digit) among all pixels.
“alabel” shows the set of labels that the network incorrectly
produces after the 1-pixel attacks. “1stap” shows the smallest
position (pixel ID) of any attackable pixel in the image. For
digit 6, the pixel at position 486 can be attacked to become 5
as well as 8 by appropriately setting the pixel’s value.
Table II summarizes the attacks identified by
DeepChecktPA for 1-pixel attack. Some images, e.g.,
digit 2, contain one attackable pixel out of 784 pixels,
whereas some others contain multiple, e.g., 47 for digit
7. All images except digit 6 when attacked get a unique
incorrect label (alabel). Digit 6 has 2 attacks but both use the
same pixel, which can be attacked in two ways: to incorrect
label 5 and incorrect label 8. The row “1stap” shows the
smallest position of any attackable pixel for each digit; this
position represents the number of attempts DeepChecktPA
takes to find the first attackable pixel for each image when
it exhaustively checks every pixel in the image. For some
digits, e.g., 4, less than 10% of the pixels are checked. For
some other digits, e.g., 1, over 62% of the pixels are checked.
Note, this exhaustive search is without utilizing the important
pixel identification, which we utilize next.
For 2-pixel attack, for each image, we select the top-5%
7digit 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
#a2p 548 198 48 93 260 463 287 651 111 171
#a2p-new 60 87 10 55 114 100 186 75 36 96
alabel 5 2,3 3 8 6 3 1,3,5,8 8,9 1,2,3 4
TABLE III: Number of 2-pixel attacks (#a2p) identified by DeepChecktPA for each image (digit), and of these attacks the
number that do not use any pixel that is attackable for a 1-pixel attack (#a2p-new). “alabel” shows the set of labels that each
digit can be attacked to incorrectly produce using the neural net. The search for 2-pixel attacks is focused on top-5% important
pixels identified by the coi metric of DeepCheckImp.
digit #ap 5%(39) 10%(78) 30%(235)abs co coi abs co coi abs co coi
0 25 12.0 28.0 64.0 28.0 44.0 68.0 80.0 64.0 68.0
1 4 0.0 25.0 75.0 25.0 50.0 100.0 75.0 100.0 100.0
2 1 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
3 1 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 100.0
4 6 66.7 50.0 66.7 66.7 50.0 66.7 100.0 66.7 66.7
5 36 2.8 5.6 30.6 11.1 8.3 50.0 38.9 33.3 52.8
6 1 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
7 47 19.1 17.0 40.4 29.8 25.5 48.9 48.9 40.4 48.9
8 2 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
9 3 0.0 0.0 66.7 0.0 0.0 66.7 66.7 66.7 66.7
TABLE IV: Important pixels and attackable pixels.
Fig. 6: Attackable pixels for 2-pixel attack highlighted in red.
For each digit, the union of all pixels that are part of any
2-pixel attack is shown.
important pixels identified by the coi metric in DeepCheckImp
and select all
(
39
2
)
= 741 unordered pairs that can be formed
using the important pixels selected, and evaluate each pair
to determine if it is attackable. Table III shows the number
of attacks identified by DeepChecktPA 2-pixel attack, and of
those attacks the number that does not include any attackable
pixel for 1-pixel attack. As expected, many 2-pixel attacks
consist of a pixel that was 1-pixel attackable. However, several
new attack pairs do not include any pixel that is attackable for
1-pixel attack are found. 4 out of 10 digits can be attacked
to create multiple incorrect labels (alabel), e.g., digit 8 can be
attacked using 3 different 2-pixel attacks to make the neural
net incorrectly classify it as 1, 2, or 3.
For each digit, Figure 6 shows the union of all pixels in any
2-pixel attack to display their location. These pixels lie on or
very close to the shape of the corresponding digit.
Overall, the use of symbolic execution enables finding both
1-pixel and 2-pixel attacks for each image.
D. Important pixels and attackable pixels
Table IV presents a comparison of important pixels and
attackable pixels for 1-pixel attack. For each image (digit), the
column “#ap” shows the number of attackable pixels identified
by DeepChecktPA for 1-pixel attack. The group of 3 columns
labeled 5% shows the percentage of attackable pixels that are
in the top-5%, i.e., 39, of the important pixels identified by
each of the 3 metrics of DeepCheckImp. The next 2 groups of
3 columns show the corresponding results for top-10% and
top-30% of important pixels. At the top-5% and top-10%
levels, coi outperforms the other two metrics in predicting
digit abs co coi
0 7(0.9%) 5(0.6%) 1(0.1%)
1 60(7.7%) 23(2.9%) 6(0.8%)
2 119(15.2%) 66(8.4%) 19(2.4%)
3 254(32.4%) 169(21.6%) 21(2.7%)
4 3(0.4%) 1(0.1%) 1(0.1%)
5 6(0.8%) 1(0.1%) 1(0.1%)
6 2(0.3%) 2(0.3%) 2(0.3%)
7 4(0.5%) 2(0.3%) 1(0.1%)
8 142(18.1%) 86(11.0%) 19(2.4%)
9 169(21.6%) 98(12.5%) 13(1.7%)
TABLE V: Smallest number of important pixels to explore for
the first 1-pixel attack for each image (digit) and each metric.
digit 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
coi 2 2 19 3 2 2 2 2 4 2
TABLE VI: Smallest number of important pixels to explore
for the first 2-pixel attack for each image for the coi metric.
attackability. For 3 of the 10 images, all attackable pixels lie
in the top-5% of important pixels identified by coi. Moreover,
for 6 of the 10 images, at least two-thirds of the attackable
pixels are in top-5% for coi. Furthermore, for 8 out of 10
images, at least one-half of attackable pixels are in the top-
5% for coi. At the top-30% level, the abs metric and coi
metric perform similarly and have higher effectiveness than
co, although the difference in the metrics reduces as % of
important pixels increases. Overall, the results show that at the
5% and 10% levels, important pixels identified by coi likely
contain majority of attackable pixels.
Table V shows for each image (digit) the smallest number of
important pixels that must be explored before a 1-pixel attack
is found for each of the three metrics. For all metrics and all
images, no more than top one-third of the important pixels
need to be checked to find an attack pixel. Moreover, for all
metrics, less than 10 pixels need to be checked to discover
an attack pixel for at least half of the images. The coi metric
requires a maximum of 21 pixels to be checked across all
the images, and for 4 images, the top most important pixel
identified by coi is an attack pixel.
Table III already shows that forming pairs using just top-5%
of the important pixels based on the coi metric allows several
2-pixel attacks on each image (digit). Table VI presents the
8smallest number of important pixels to explore to find the
first 2-pixel attack for each image (digit) based on the coi
metric. The worst case is for digit 2, where top-19 important
pixels must be considered to find a 2-pixel attack. The best
case happens for 7 out of 10 digits, where the top-2 important
pixels allow DeepChecktPAto create a 2-pixel attack; for these
7 cases, using DeepCheckImp with coi metric presents an
optimal strategy to find a 2-pixel attack. Moreover, for 9 out
of 10 digits, a 2-pixel attack is found within just the top-4
important pixels, i.e., exploration of no more than 6 pairs.
Overall, important pixel identification using DeepCheckImp
plays an important role in focusing the exploration of
DeepChecktPA to find 1-pixel and 2-pixel attacks.
VI. RELATED WORK
Recent independent work, developed concurrently with
ours, proposes concolic testing for deep neural networks [27].
However their focus is on defining and achieving test cov-
erage requirements, although their approach also produces
adversarial images. In contrast we use symbolic execution for
identifying important pixels and for specific 1-pixel and 2-
pixel attacks, which target the same activation pattern as the
original image; furthermore we use important pixels to focus
the search for attackable pixels. Another difference is that
we use off-the-shelf solvers. Other related recent techniques
include formal methods [15] and testing [23], [30] for deep
neural networks. However none of previous work uses formal
methods for important pixel identification, or more generally
for explainability in neural networks.
The rest of this section describes existing techniques related
to attribution or explainability in neural networks and also
existing techniques for adversarial example generation.
A. Techniques for Attribution
Despite the wide-spread adoption of neural networks, most
deep neural network classifiers are black-boxes. It is crucial
to understand the reasons behind the predictions of these
classifiers in order to build trust in the model. Therefore, a
number of techniques have been explored in the area of gen-
erating explanations for predictions. Attribution is a specific
class of approaches, mostly applicable to image classification
applications, where the technique attempts to assign "rele-
vance", "contribution" to each input feature or pixel towards
the classification decision. We describe below broad categories
of attribution approaches.
Perturbation-based approaches alter the value of every input
feature individually by a specific amount [32], re-run the
network on the input and then measure the difference in the
output value. However, these techniques tend to be slow and
the computation time increases with the number of features.
Gradient-based approaches [25]) compute the attributions of
every feature in a single forward and backward pass of the
network on a given input. They compute the signed partial
derivative of the output w.r.t each input variable and multiple it
by the input value to determine the impact of that variable on
the output. Integrated-gradients [28]) proposed an approach
that take an average of the attributions calculate along a
linear path from a baseline (user-defined) until the given input.
Saliency maps [26] consider the absolute value of the partial
derivatives of the output w.r.t each input variable in order to
identify pixels that can perturbed the least to observe a sizable
change in the output value.
B. Techniques for adversarial attack generation
It has been observed that state-of-the-art networks are highly
vulnerable to adversarial perturbations: given a correctly-
classified input x, it is possible to find a new input x′ that is
very similar to x but is assigned a different label [29]. Good-
fellow et al. [14] introduced the Fast Gradient Sign Method
for crafting adversarial perturbations using the derivative of the
model’s loss function with respect to the input feature vector.
They show that NNs trained for the MNIST and CIFAR-10
classification tasks can be fooled with a high success rate.
An extension of this approach applies the technique in an
iterative manner [12]. Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack
(JSMA) [22] proposed a method for targeted misclassification
by exploiting the forward derivative of a NN to find an
adversarial perturbation that will force the model to misclas-
sify into a specific target class. Carlini et. al. [5] recently
proposed an approach that could not be resisted by state-
of-the-art networks such as those using defensive distillation.
Their optimization algorithm uses better loss functions and
parameters (empirically determined) and uses three different
distance metrics.
The DeepFool [21] technique simplifies the domain by
considering the network to be completely linear. They compute
adversarial inputs on the tangent plane (orthogonal projection)
of a point on the classifier function. They then introduce
non-linearity to the model, and repeat this process until a
true adversarial example is found. Deep Learning Verification
(DLV) [15] is an approach that defines a region of safety
around a known input and applies SMT solving for checking
robustness. They consider the input space to be discretized
and alter the input using manipulations until it is at a minimal
distance from the original, to generate possibly-adversarial
inputs. DeepSafe [10] is an approach that first applies a label-
guided clustering algorithm on inputs with known labels to
identify input regions that can be expected to be consistently
labeled. It then employs the Reluplex solver [16] to verify that
the all possible inputs within a given region are assigned the
same label by the network.
VII. CONCLUSION
As deep neural networks become more and more commonly
used in tasks of high importance, developing techniques that
validate them becomes increasingly urgent. This paper intro-
duced a new approach for validating neural networks based on
the classic program analysis of symbolic execution. The key
insight is to transform the network into an imperative program
that is amenable to analysis using symbolic execution. Two
analyses are presented: 1) to identify important pixels that can
explain the classification decisions made by a neural network;
and 2) to create 1-pixel and 2-pixel attacks by identifying
pixels or pixel-pairs and computing their values so the neural
network misclassifies the modified images. The two analyses
apply in synergy and provide a more scalable approach to
9finding attacks. An experimental evaluation using the widely
studied MNIST dataset demonstrates that the usefulness of
symbolic execution in analyzing neural networks.
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APPENDIX
Table VII highlights in green the top-30% (i.e., 235) impor-
tant pixels identified by DeepCheckImp for each of the three
metrics abs, co, and coi for each image (digit).
digit abs co coi
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
TABLE VII: Top-30% (i.e., 235) of important pixels (green)
identified by DeepCheckImp for abs, co, and coi.
